Bioterrorism Preparedness--Anthrax by Lawhorn, D. Bruce
The World Trade Center and
Pentagon disaster and the bioterror-
ist events of 2001 have dramatically
advanced the need for veterinari-
ans, physicians, all other allied-
health professionals, livestock and
poultry producers and the general
public to become more knowledge-
able about possible biologic agents
that terrorists might release. While
direct exposure to disease agents in
human beings from bioterrorist
attacks has been in the spotlight,
livestock and the nation’s food 
and water supplies are also possible
targets.
Why Anthrax?
Of all the biologic agents, why
might anthrax be the first choice?
Anthrax could be a desirable agent
to a terrorist because it is cheap,
effective, easy to produce and 
simple to store (the highly resistant
and dormant spores have been
shown to survive at least 60 years
in soil in a laboratory). 
From an economic viewpoint, bio-
logical weapons are a very inexpen-
sive way to inflict casualties.
Research conducted during the cold
war era found that the costs per
square kilometer to deliver
weapons of mass destruction for
civilian targets (in 1969 US dollars)
was $2,000 for conventional
weapons, $800 for nuclear, $600 for
chemical and $1 for biological
weapons. It is expected that today’s
costs could likely be extrapolated
with similar cost ratios. (Note: the
United States ceased the produc-
tion of biological weapons in 1972,
after the world’s nations signed a
treaty banning them. Consequently,
there is a dearth of research in
recent years.)
Studies performed in the 1970s
comparing brucellosis, Q-fever,
tularemia and anthrax found that
after a hypothetical airplane
release of 50 kg of agent along a 2
km line upwind of a population
center of 500,000, all agents caused
incapacitation of 100,000 or more
inhabitants and reached downwind
for at least 10 km. Anthrax killed
95,000 people and incapacitated
another 125,000 inhabitants and
ranged downwind for more than 20
km, further than any other agent in
this simulation.
Anthrax in People
Symptoms
Depending on the route of entry
into the body, infection by anthrax
organisms produces three recog-
nized forms of disease in human
beings — cutaneous, pulmonary
and gastrointestinal anthrax. Rare
cases of anthrax meningitis have
also been documented.
The cutaneous form is the most
common and accounts for more
than 90 percent of the cases in peo-
ple. It has an incubation period of 2
to 6 days after inoculation of a
spore or vegetative bacilli into a
wound. A reddened, raised lesion
develops that may be mistaken for
an insect bite. It develops into a
blister that later becomes black and
very obvious. Edema (swelling or
accumulation of fluid) often
extends to the associated lymph
nodes and beyond. A lesion on the
head or neck can produce throat
swelling so severe that a tracheal
tube must be placed to insure a
clear air passage. Mortality is low 
if treated but can approach 20 per-
cent in untreated cases.
The pulmonary form has an incu-
bation period of 1 to 6 days after
inhaling the anthrax spores. It
begins like many common respira-
tory infections with fever, malaise,
muscle pain and coughing. In the
second phase, 3 to 5 days later, the
patient suddenly develops respira-
tory distress, sweating, cyanosis
and shock. Death may occur within
24 hours. Mortality is close to 100
percent if untreated and may be as
high as 80 percent, even with treat-
ment.
The incubation period of the gas-
trointestinal form is 12 hours to 5
days after eating contaminated
L-5418
4-02
Bioterrorism Preparedness —
Anthrax
D. Bruce Lawhorn
Professor and Extension Swine Veterinarian, Texas Cooperative Extension
The Texas A&M University System
meat. The patient develops fever,
vomiting, bloody diarrhea and
malaise. Mortality can be close to
50 percent if untreated.
After an airplane release of anthrax
spores, exposure of human beings
through dermal (skin cuts and abra-
sions) routes would likely cause an
estimated 20 percent mortality rate
in untreated cases; oral routes, 25
to 60 percent; and inhalation, as
high as 100 percent. The mortality
rate from an individual with multi-
ple exposure routes would be more
difficult to predict.
Treatment and Prevention
Treatment is with ciprofloxacin,
doxycycline or penicillin. Cipro-
floxacin is used as the antibiotic 
of choice for possible genetically
engineered, biologic warfare strains
of anthrax that are resistant to
penicillin and doxycycline. 
Also, inhalation anthrax is very 
difficult to treat, especially after
symptoms are apparent. Even high
dose antibiotic therapy may reduce
the mortality rate only to 80 per-
cent. In addition, an extended
duration of therapy (60 days) is 
recommended for inhalation 
exposure because of the persistence
of spores that are resistant to
antibiotics. Even with long term
antibiotic therapy, persistent spores
in the respiratory tract may germi-
nate after treatment has ended to
cause anthrax many weeks after
the initial exposure. No evidence
supports the existence of persistent
spores associated with the gastroin-
testinal form of anthrax. 
After a terrorist attack, possibly 
the best case management option
for physicians is an extended
course of ciprofloxacin, combined
with administration of human
anthrax vaccine.
Members of the U.S. armed forces
and emergency essential Depart-
ment of Defense employees and
contractors assigned to high threat
areas may have been immunized
with human anthrax vaccine. The
current vaccination schedule is
three subcutaneous inoculations 2
weeks apart, followed by doses at
6, 12 and 18 months and annual
boosters. This vaccine is not avail-
able to the general public. 
Human anthrax vaccine informa-
tion is available from the Texas
Department of Health
(http://www.tdh.state.tx.us/) or at the
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report (http://www.cdc.gov/),
“Use of Anthrax Vaccine in the
United States — Recommendations
of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices,” Dec. 15,
2000, Vol.49, No. RR-15 (404-639-
3158 [p]) and
http://www.anthrax.osd.mil.
Anthrax Signs
in Animals
Animals would also be casualties 
of a terrorist attack. Livestock, deer
and other wild ruminants usually
become infected when they ingest
anthrax spores while grazing or in
contaminated feed (e.g. domestic
and feral swine). The incubation
period is 3 to 7 days and can be
peracute, acute or chronic. In the
peracute form, an animal that was
normal just a few hours earlier
may be found dead. Cattle, sheep,
goats and deer typically have the
peracute form. 
Animals with the acute form may
rapidly develop fever (up to 107.6
degrees F), stagger, tremble and
have signs of abdominal pain and
respiratory distress. They may have
blood-tinged diarrhea, blood in the
urine and milk and hemorrhaging
from the mouth and nose. Pregnant
animals may abort. Animals may
die within 24 hours, with convul-
sions in the terminal stage of the
disease. The acute form is more
common in cattle, sheep, horses
and deer. 
In swine, the disease tends to be
chronic. Swelling in the head and
neck often interferes with breath-
ing and swallowing and may cause
death by asphyxiation. There may
be blood-tinged mucous discharge
from the mouth and snout. Some
affected swine may recover with-
out treatment. The chronic form is
also seen in horses and dogs.
Chronic cases of anthrax are more
responsive to antibiotic treatment.
Although cats and dogs may devel-
op anthrax from ingesting contami-
nated meat, both species seem to
be resistant to inhalation anthrax.
Isolation, decontamination and
medication of cats and dogs
exposed to anthrax spores would be
important procedures after a bioter-
rorist event.
Anthrax can resemble other condi-
tions that cause sudden death. In
cattle and sheep, this includes
clostridial infections, bloat, light-
ning strike, acute leptospirosis,
bacillary hemoglobinuria, anaplas-
mosis, babesiosis, and acute poison-
ing with bracken fern, sweet
clover, lead or blue-green algae. In
horses, acute equine infectious ane-
mia, colic, lightning strike, lead poi-
soning and blue-green algae poison-
ing may resemble anthrax. In
swine, classical swine fever (hog
cholera), African swine fever, and
pharyngeal malignant edema symp-
toms are similar to anthrax.
Poisoning and non-fatal vehicle col-
lision could mimic anthrax in deer.
Containment and Treatment
The carcass of an animal killed by
anthrax generally shows little or no
rigor mortis, and there is usually
dark blood oozing from the mouth,
nose and anus (the blood may not
clot). The body will be bloated and
will decompose rapidly. Do not
cut into a suspicious carcass!
Veterinarians are trained to collect
a blood sample from a large vein
collected through the unopened
skin for submission for laboratory
confirmation. 
Treatment in naturally occurring
cases is more successful if it occurs
early in the course of the disease.
The recommended twice daily dose
of penicillin IM (intramuscular) for
livestock is 22,000 units/kg (10,000
units/pound) for 5 days. The daily
oxytetracycline dose is 5 mg/kg 
(2.3 mg/lb) for all species. It may
be given as an IM or by IV (intra-
venous) injection (slowly) in divid-
ed doses for at least 5 days (up to
26 to 28 days withdrawal time,
depending on the product used).
An alternative antibiotic such as
ciprofloxacin may be used if antibi-
otic resistant anthrax is used in a
terrorist attack. Extra-label usage of
penicillin as indicated above or
ciprofloxacin would require an
extended withdrawal time of at
least 30 days in food animals.
Extra-label use means for purposes
or at dosages not approved. Only
veterinarians can prescribe extra-
label drugs — when a
veterinary/client-patient relation-
ship exists. On their own, produc-
ers cannot prescribe or use drugs
in an extra-label manner.
The disease management technique
of isolating sick animals under-
going treatment from healthy-
appearing animals should be prac-
ticed at the immediate premise.
Animals should not be moved off
the premise until at least 10 days
after all livestock are vaccinated
and after proper disposal of all 
carcasses. The number of quaran-
tine days may be extended in the
special case of terrorist attack,
when livestock (and many other
animals, pets, etc.) may be exposed
by unnatural routes of infection
(e.g. inhalation, cutaneous or 
combinations). 
Veterinarians are required to report
suspected cases to their respective
state animal health agency and
department of human health. If
anthrax is confirmed, the prelimi-
nary quarantine issued by the state
animal health agency will be fully
enforced.
Anthrax Vaccination
in Animals
In anthrax outbreak situations, live-
stock deaths should start to subside
at about 10 days after vaccination.
A second dose of vaccine should be
given 2 to 4 weeks later. Areas sub-
jugated to terrorist attack and seed-
ing of the ground with anthrax
spores may be sources for anthrax
infection for a long time (depend-
ing on soil type and seasonal envi-
ronmental conditions). In those
cases, it will be necessary to
administer vaccine to livestock in
these geographic locations at least
once yearly, 4 weeks before the
start of environmental conditions
that foster seasonal anthrax out-
breaks. These are the same recom-
mendations for areas of the United
States currently having seasonal
endemic anthrax outbreaks (e.g.
Southwest Texas). 
Reactions to anthrax vaccine may
include swelling at the injection
site, fever for several days, lowered
milk production and abortion. Milk
from dairy cows developing fever
after vaccination should be
destroyed. Antibiotics given within
7 days of vaccine administration
can make the vaccine ineffective
since it is a live attenuated biologic
(formulated with live organisms).
Animals should not go to slaughter
until at least 60 days after vaccina-
tion.
Environmental Cleanup
The best ways to prevent future
anthrax outbreaks is to keep from
releasing more spores into the envi-
ronment and to destroy existing
spores. Anthrax bacteria-contami-
nated carcasses, bedding, soil and
other materials should be burned
as soon as possible. Burn carcasses
where they lie. If carcasses must be
moved, use a sled so as not to
spread anthrax organisms by drag-
ging the carcass across the ground.
Remember, do not open the car-
cass. The vegetative form of the
anthrax bacteria in the carcass is
killed by burning. If the carcass is
opened and vegetative forms are
exposed to air, the transformation
to the spore form will be a future
source of infection. Thorough burn-
ing kills spores.
In the event of a terrorist anthrax
attack that kills livestock and con-
taminants pets, personnel in respi-
rators and protective clothing will
perform environmental clean up,
decontaminate pets and burn dead
animals. (Anthrax vaccination alone
in clean up workers may not pro-
vide complete protection if work is
performed close to the release
point, so personal protective gear
and respirators are a necessity).
Contaminated equipment will then
have to be sanitized with a sporoci-
dal disinfectant, such as 5 percent
sodium hydroxide (lye).Usual con-
centrations of many common disin-
fectants are not effective against
anthrax spores. 
Successful Anthrax
Release Depends on
Many Variables 
Fortunately for livestock, pets and
people — the potential targets —
successful attack with biological
weapons hinges on many variables.
In the case of anthrax spores dis-
persed by airplane, any carrier that
contains anthrax spores must be
correctly formulated, and the
weather conditions must be stable.
Mini-environments, such as wind
currents between and among build-
ings in large population centers,
make even distribution of agents
unpredictable. Rainfall and change
in wind directions also affect distri-
bution. Remember that the same
terrorists who successfully killed
Japanese citizens with Sarin gas
were unsuccessful with anthrax
spores and botulinum toxin releas-
es. Researchers know that even
under the most controlled condi-
tions, it is sometimes very difficult
to consistently cause experimental
disease from various bacterial
agents by direct animal inoculation.
Aerosol exposure might be even
less reliable.
Although anthrax spores delivered
by postal letters have recently
caused successful human expo-
sures, mass exposure through
aerosol release might not be as suc-
cessful.
A bioterrorist attack might be
attempted indirectly through food
or water. Any food product suspect-
ed or found to be contaminated
with anthrax organisms should be
destroyed, preferably by incinera-
tion. Livestock producers should be
alert to never send to slaughter any
animal showing possible signs of
anthrax. Also, do not touch, field
dress or process the carcass of deer,
other wild ruminants or livestock
that may have been incubating or
showing symptoms of anthrax 
prior to harvest. Do not eat the
meat or use other products from
such animals.
Attempts to cause anthrax through
contamination of water may not be
very successful. Within 24 hours of
experimental inoculation into
water, vegetative anthrax organisms
were undetectable. Less informa-
tion seems to be available on the
possible transmission via spores
through contaminated water.
Testing for the presence of Bacillus
anthracis by experts would be the
first step for evaluation of such a
scenario.
Be Prepared
In summary, what can people do to
prepare for the possibility of a ter-
rorist attack by anthrax or other
bioterrorist agents? They can
 Know the clinical signs for and
countermeasures against the
most probable bioterrorist
agents. 
 Talk to neighbors and become
acquainted with their pets and
livestock. 
 Report any suspicious behavior
in people or any increase in ani-
mal deaths anywhere and every-
where you go. 
 Become involved in local, state
or national efforts to prepare for
these possible emergencies. 
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